The Modernity Myth

November 26th, 2007

The concept of modernity is flawed and, in most cases, is not a useful way to understand global history or the history of any country. In most works modernity is a vague, poorly defined concept and when it is not it is typically Eurocentric. Historical works employing the concept of modernity often incorrectly depict certain phenomenon as newer than they actually are, or ignore its existence until Europeans adopt it, at which point they treat it as new and modern. Bureaucratic states and colonialism, for example, predate the modern era by centuries yet are wrongly depicted as examples of modernity after Europeans adopted them. In other cases authors treat modernity as whatever Europeans (or Americans) were doing at the time. When another part of the world became more like Europe (or the United States) authors label the change as adopting modernity, which measures the planet by European standards and implies people who don’t copy Europe are backwards or pre-modern. Two otherwise reasonable academic histories of non-Western peoples, Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Hazards of World History by Alexander Woodside and Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870-1920 by Akram Fouad Khater, illustrate the flaws in the concept of modernity.

East Asia

Woodside’s Lost Modernities implicitly discredits the idea of modernity itself, although the author does not make this conclusion. Woodside convincingly shows that the bureaucratic “rational” state, and many of the problems and behaviors associated with it, emerged in China, Korea, and Vietnam centuries before the West. Since this type of state is usually considered a part of modernity its early existence in East Asia means modernity either began in the Middle Ages (which contradicts the meaning of modern) or is not a valid concept. Modernity is a myth. Like Marxism and religion, it is historically important because many people have believed in it and acted on those beliefs but it is a failed concept.

Woodside admits that modernity is a problematic concept, but stops short of rejecting it altogether. His reasons for doing so are not explained well and are poorly supported. He claims, “few non-Western peasants, aware of the existence elsewhere of better technology and better hopes of self-advancement through education, would agree that modernity was a failed concept.” (p. 34) He presents no evidence to support this claim; if we want to know what non-Western peasants think we should ask them and not merely assume they believe in “modernity” or anything else. They could just as easily blame global inequalities on imperialism, capitalism, the legacy of colonialism, Satan, or a host of other things. It seems unlikely that three billion people would all believe the same thing.

Even if all non-Western peasants do believe in modernity, it doesn't necessarily follow that everything a non-Western peasant believes is correct. Like other social groups, non-Western peasants have believed in all sorts of false things in the past such as Marxism, Christianity, nationalism, and magic. Woodside is basically appealing to liberal guilt and, like many liberals, simply assumes what the oppressed believe and need rather than asking them what they believe and need.

The existence of a welfare state in East Asia’s Mandarinates prior to the supposed onset of “modernity” further discredits the concept. Welfare states in the West began in the late nineteenth century and grew through much of the twentieth century; in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries they contracted. Welfare states are often considered part of “modernity” but their existence in East Asia centuries before “modernity” again discredits the concept. Unfortunately, Woodside's discussion of East Asian welfare states is more of an intellectual and political history. He says little about the role of peasants or other subaltern classes in the role of the welfare state. Working class unrest and radicalism played an important role in the rise and fall of Western welfare states; it would be interesting to see how similar or different the role of class struggle was in the creation and evolution of East Asian welfare states.

Mount Lebanon

Akram Fouad Khater's Inventing Home is an important contribution to the history of migration from Mount Lebanon to the Western Hemisphere and the impact of return migration on Mount Lebanon. Despite some good points the book is marred by its vague conception of “modernity,” its assumption that “modernity” is something which comes from outside Mount Lebanon (from the West), and a disjuncture between the first and second halves of the book. Despite making useful contributions, the work has several major flaws.

Khater examines several topics often ignored in previous histories, attempting to blend socio-economic and cultural analyses together. He rightly criticizes previous histories for ignoring the fact that around a third of the population emigrated from Mount Lebanon and that a large portion of those migrants returned to Mount Lebanon. Khater primarily focuses on their migration to and from the United States, although he does note that they also migrated to other parts of the Americas. He argues that return migrants became part of a new rising middle class and brought with them “modernity” from the U.S, which played an important role in “modernizing” Mount Lebanon. His work draws on a wide variety of sources, include newspapers, interviews, novels, school records, church records, diaries and traveler's accounts.

The worst flaw in Inventing Home is how it handles “modernity.” Khater never gives an adequate definition of the term and puts the term in quotes whenever he uses it. The closest he comes to defining modernity is when he states it is, “a set of ideas and a material culture that [migrants] ... used to distinguish themselves from their peasant heritage.” (p. 3) As a definition, this is vague and doesn't really tell us what modernity is or how it differs from something that is not modernity. At one point he even calls modernity an “imagined state of being.” (p. 2) Since modernity is central to Khater's argument, this is a major flaw in the work.

Inventing Home portrays modernity as something that comes from the United States, from outside Mount Lebanon and the Ottoman Empire (which ruled Mount Lebanon at the time). Khater claims it was brought to Mount Lebanon by return migrants. While he convincingly shows that elements of US culture influenced culture in Mount Lebanon through return migrants, he does not explain why this constitutes “modernity.” His argument is problematic because the reverse is also true – the evolution of US culture was heavily influenced by immigrants from Mount Lebanon and many other parts of the world. Khater does not explain why US influences on Lebanese culture constitute “modernity” but the reverse does not also hold true.

Another, less important, flaw is Inventing Home's disjuncture between the first and second halves of the work. The first half focuses on socio-economic history, while the second is a cultural history relying on different types of sources, such as novels. The result is a second half that to some extent clashes with the first half and is not as well supported as the first half. Khater does not sufficiently follow up the topics he discusses in the first half, such as how return migrants affected the socio-economic (as opposed to cultural) evolution of the village.

Despite these flaws the work still makes an important contribution to the history of immigration and Mount Lebanon. Khater shows the importance of taking into account gender, family, return migration and transnational influences arriving from migration, a contribution with applications far beyond Khater's own argument and subject. The work is also useful to people interested in US history because it gives a better understanding of immigration by looking at the other side of the ocean.

Labelling peoples as having adopted or not adopted modernity is inaccurate and should be avoided. A region did not adopt modernity simply because it became more like Europe, and it is was not backwards simply because it was different. We should not exaggerate how much is new about the last two hundred years, and should avoid assuming that something is new just because it is new to Europe. To truly understand global history we must study every region of the globe.