Fighting Tyranny with Tyranny
The Effect of the Korean War on US-Spanish Relations
November 27th, 2002
The Korean War had numerous “ripple effects” on international events that at first do not seem intuitive. One of the many changes in international relations brought about by the Korean War was the diplomatic resuscitation of Spain. Because they supported the Axis during the Second World War, Spain became internationally isolated after the end of the war. The Korean War acted as a catalyst to end Spain’s isolation. As a result of the Korean War, Spain went from being an international pariah state to an ally of the American Empire in its fight against the Soviet Empire.
In the wake of Napoleon’s invasion of Spain and then being driven out, Spain lost most of its empire and underwent a series of revolutions and counter-revolutions influenced by the ideas of the French revolution. Proponents of republicanism and free market capitalism clashed with defenders of the monarchy and the old semi-feudal aristocratic system. In the start of the 20th century Spain was ruled by a monarchy. That monarchy fell in 1931 and a republic came to rule Spain. In 1936 General Franco launched a civil war between fascists and a coalitions of leftists which destroyed the Republic and, with Franco’s victory in 1939, brought Spanish fascism to power with Franco at it’s head. At the start of the civil war a brief anarcho-syndicalist revolution was launched, but crushed by the Republicans and Communists.
During the Second World War Spain remained within the axis camp and provided assistance to the axis war effort. Spain never joined the war, however, due to repeated failures to negotiate a deal with Hitler. After the defeat of the Axis powers Spain stood alone and isolated from the rest of the world. Since Spain never got around to joining the war the allies did not invade it but because it was on the losing side of the war it was hated by the victorious powers.
Spain was excluded from the UN, NATO, Marshall Plan and several other international efforts. In 1946 the UN passed a resolution condemning Spain and calling on all member countries to cut off diplomatic contact with Spain and withdraw their ambassadors. Most countries did this. Those that did not were mostly fellow rightist dictatorial regimes – including the semi-fascist state in Argentina, several Middle Eastern monarchies and Salazar’s dictatorship in neighboring Portugal. Portugal, which was a NATO member at the time, actively advocated Spain’s inclusion in the international community but had little success until the 1950s.
This isolation began to end as the cold war started. The Berlin blockade, Chinese revolution and Soviet test detonation of nuclear weapons all confirmed the increasingly clear division of the world into a bipolar order. Spain took advantage of the deteriorating relations between the two superpowers to push for Spanish integration into the Western camp.
The U.S. began to pay more attention to the potential military benefits of working with Spain. The Join Chiefs of Staff commissioned a study, “Drumbeat,” which concluded in August 1947 that from a military point of view it would be in the United States best interests to furnish Spain with economic aid and to have friendlier relations. Shortly afterwards the Policy Planning Staff, based on military considerations, decided that it would be best to modify the U.S. stance towards Spain.
Spain had several potential military benefits for the United States. Intercontinental ballistic missiles had not yet been invented in 1950 so to bomb Warsaw Pact nations the US needed air bases within range of enemy territory. Bombers stationed in Spain could deliver both conventional and nuclear bombs to the USSR & its European puppet states, but were far enough from the border that the Red Army could not reach the bases without going through much of NATO territory. In addition, naval bases in Spain would allow the US military to control the Mediterranean Sea.
All this represented at most “a normalization of relations between the two countries and they might not have gone on to form a special tie but for the outbreak of the Korean War.” [1] In early 1950 NSC 72 analyzed the U.S. position towards Spain and recommended that the U.S. change its policies towards Spain so as to improve US military capabilities in Europe. The proposal to do this went nowhere. President Truman was both anti-fascist and anti-communist and was opposed to the whole idea of allying with a fascist state. He called the report “decidedly militaristic and in my opinion not realistic with present conditions.” [2] It was the start of the Korean War that changed this.
On July 31, not long after the Korean War had started, the Secretary of Defense sent a memorandum to the President reminding him that:
with reference to the provision of military aid to Spain under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act … the President is now authorized to transfer military assistance … to any other European nation not now specified in the Act. … [therefore] you are authorized to transfer military aid to Spain in an amount not to exceed 10% of the aggregate of the funds and contract authority made available under each of the three titles of the Act. [3]
Almost immediately after the Korean War broke out Senator Pat McCarran proposed an amendment to the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 that would authorize 100 million dollars of loans to Spain. This proposal was approved by a vote of 65 to 15 on August 1st, 1950. On April 27 of the same year a similar proposal by Senator McCarran to loan Spain 50 million was defeated by 42 to 35. He was able to pass the loan for twice the amount four months later because of the start of the Korean War in late June. One supporter of the bill, Senator Walter F. George, made the link between the Korean War and changing relations with Spain clear:
Tragic as this war is – and it is tragic beyond description – it still will serve us and the other free people of the world well in the future, if it has the effect of returning America to a sense of realism. [4]
Of course, for Senator George, “a sense of realism” included working with fascists to defeat Moscow. The House later reduced the amount to 62.5 million and President Truman signed the bill on September 6th, 1950. For the first time since the Spanish Civil war the Export-Import Bank earmarked funds for Spain.
Senator Joseph McCarthy was strongly in favor of an alliance with Spain, claiming, “there is no war on God’s earth to defend the richest prize for which Communist Russia is aiming – the industrial heart of Europe – unless we use those two great wells of tough anti-Communist manpower, Western Germany and Spain.” [5] In a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to the Secretary of State the link between the Korean War and changing policy towards Fascist Spain was against made clear:
Changing conditions resulting from Soviet-inspired aggression and the consequent danger of global war, require a reconsideration of US policy toward Spain which will serve the immediate requirements of our national security. … our immediate objective should be to develop the military potentialities of Spain’s strategic geographic position for the common defense, all such action to be guided by the political considerations set forth in NSC 72/1. When plans for the use of Spain for the common defense of Western Europe and the Mediterranean and North Atlantic areas have been completed we should approach the Spanish government in order to acquire such facilities as air and naval bases. [6]
On November 4th, 1950 the UN passed a resolution repealing part of the earlier 1946 resolution condemning Spain. The resolution resolved:
1. To revoke the recommendation for the withdrawal of Ambassadors and Ministers from Madrid, contained in the General Assembly resolution of December 12, 1946.
2. To revoke the recommendation intended to debar Spain from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations, which recommendation is a part of the same resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 concerning relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain. [7]
A year later Spain was admitted to the Food and Agricultural Organization.
The warming relations towards Spain caused by the Korean War made it possible for those who had been advocating a military alliance with Spain to push forward their agenda. In 1952 negotiations between the United States and Spain for a treaty started. France and England objected to the idea of bringing Spain into the fold, but their objections were eventually overcame; though they did prevent Spain’s entry into NATO for several decades.
The negotiations went through three main phases. In the first phase each side familiarized themselves with what the other wanted and began preliminary negotiations. The US wanted to obtain several air force bases in Spain, strategically located to be capable of striking the Soviet Empire but out of the reach of the Red Army. The US also wanted naval bases and to establish the headquarters of the sixth fleet in one. The sixth fleet was assigned to the Mediterranean, a strategically important location. Spain wanted military and economic aid to help their economy recover and “wanted to be assured that, in case of war, sufficient forces together with the necessary equipment were under Spanish command to guarantee the defense of the country against an invading force.” [8] This meant that the U.S. would have to either build up Spain’s defenses into a state of the art army (a very expensive option) or sign a bilateral treaty similar to NATO that would guarantee U.S. defense of Spain in the event of war. U.S. negotiators opted for the later. They seemed to be near reaching an agreement in late 1952 but Franco suddenly withdrew all concessions, hoping to get a better deal by holding out.
The second phase of negotiations lasted from December 1952 to mid-1953. During this period negotiations went nowhere. The transfer of power from Truman to Eisenhower temporarily disrupted the negotiations in early 1952. Each side employed diplomatic bluffs and counter-bluffs, trying to gain the upper hand in negotiations.
This ended in June 1953 when both sides decided to try and find an acceptable compromise, starting the third and final phase of negotiations. The US agreed to defend Spain from any invasion and Spain agreed to provide bases for the US. The US would have to first get permission from Spain before using the bases to fight other countries - except in the case of a Soviet sneak attack, in which case the US could use them at will. This later provision was made secret so as to avoid domestic criticism in both countries. Franco’s regime was based on nationalist ideology and making it secret avoided the impression that Spain was being subordinated to the U.S. and the U.S., which was based on democratic ideology, wanted to avoid criticism of backing fascism.
President Eisenhower completed the deal by signing the Pact of Madrid on September 26, 1953, just two months after the end of the Korean War. Officially the pact was not a treaty but an “executive order.” This was in effect the same as a treaty, except the President didn’t have to get the Senate’s approval of it – effectively subverting part of the constitution. In exchange for the bases Spain received 600 million dollars in military aid and 500 million in economic aid. Commenting on the Pact, Eisenhower said:
It is a quid pro quo; they had certain things that we need and are valuable to us, and we made certain arrangements in order to get those things. I might say that this thing has been in the mill for a long time … and we believe it is something that will work to the benefit of the United States. [9]
Even more important then the money Spain gained was Spain’s readmittance into the international community. Spain would soon be admitted to the United Nations and many other international organizations. Eventually it would join NATO. This was the start of Spain’s journey out of isolation and into the western camp, eventually becoming a normal west European country.
Notes
[1] Whitaker, p. 37
[2] Pollack, p. 1562
[3] Pollack, p. 1572-3
[4] Congressional Record, 1950
[5] McCarthy, p. 49
[6] Pollack, p. 1577 - 1579
[7] Rubottom, p. 93
[8] Leitz, p. 272
[9] Reid, p. 622
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